The NDS’s shortcomings in directly addressing strategic alliances between America’ adversaries and competitors is also visible in the growing Russia-Iran relationship. A supplemental National Defense Strategy should consider Beijing’s behavior in the Middle East, particularly, its willingness to help restore diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran, which remained frozen for more than seven years. In turn, otherwise-isolated Tehran welcomes these avenues for cross-border connection to assert its dominance in the region. presence or influence in the region, China’s involvement embodies a short-term pragmatic approach based on opportunism. While the breakthrough does not automatically equate to China replacing U.S. The Saudi-Iran detente brokered by China in April further showcases an expanding relationship that drags the “pacing challenge” into the Middle East. Advancements such as the 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement and Iran’s recent membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization reflect Tehran’s strategy of looking East for survival under international isolation and pressure.īeijing has also taken advantage of years of hard-hitting sanctions on Iran, becoming Tehran’s biggest oil consumer in exchange for technological development, intelligence resources, and modernized military hardware that is used to both quell domestic grievances and contribute to cross-border violence. For the last ten years, China has been Iran’s largest trading partner. Several years of Sino-Iranian economic cooperation, as well as the Chinese-brokered detente between Iran and Saudi Arabia, exemplify the need for Washington’s attention. economic and global security interests, but also sets a meager precedent for how Washington’s national defense apparatus approaches colluding adversaries. Separating the “pacing challenge” from its linkages to Iran not only ignores how these two nations’ bilateral cooperation threatens U.S. But the missing piece is how the two continue to collaborate, and the effect this has on integrated deterrence calculations. Meanwhile, Iran is described in the context of its regionally destabilizing proxy warfare and terrorism, as well as its pursuit of nuclear weapons. government departments and agencies to address shifting national security challenges.Īs it stands, the National Defense Strategy is too narrow in its characterization of China, isolating the “pacing challenge” it poses (that is, its threat of China overtaking the U.S.) in a separate box from Iran’s designation as a “persistent threat.” The NDS echoes the National Security Strategy, painting China as the only other nation with “both the intent to reshape the international order, and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so.” Updating this policy would better enable U.S. ![]() To address this, the Biden administration should release a supplemental strategy to the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) that specifically acknowledges greater cooperation between Beijing and Tehran.
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